professed neutrality and announced that lethal war materials would not be licensed for export to either combatant (e.g. Scott D1.4: D2.419). Political and commercial difficulties attended this position from the first. In 1979 Iran -which the US, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States all actively opposed -held 74 outstanding contracts with International Military Services (wholly owned by the Ministry of Defence, MOD). By 1984 negotiations had resolved outstanding issues regarding 36 contracts and between 1981-4 Iran bought some £2000 million worth of goods from the UK. Similar difficulties attended consideration of restrictions on exports to Iraq which had increased from £201 million in 1979 to £874 million in 1982 and likewise totalled some £2000 million in the period to 1984. UK sales of defence-related material to Iraq totalled not less than £184 million in the first four years of the war as against similar sales to Iran of £13 million in the same period (D1.15). In the face of these considerations ministers agreed in 1981 that 'every opportunity should be taken to exploit Iraq's potentialities as a promising market for the sale of defence equipment' and that '"lethal items" should be interpreted in the narrowest possible sense, and the obligations of flexibility as flexibly as possible' (D1.10; also D1.3-16).
This approach led to the ambiguous and discretionary guidelines which became the hallmark of Government policy in the pursuit of its interest both that UK business be enabled to profit from the sale of defence related goods and establish access to potential future markets, and that Government retain control over the flow of material in accord with its perception at any time regarding the balance of foreign and economic policy interests. That such would be possible -without incurring the criticisms of friendly states and/or other potential customers, the parliamentary opposition, the press and the public -was the rationale for establishing Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe's Guidelines of December 1984 (D1.17-94: 146-7):
(i) … maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal equipment to either side; (ii) subject to … fulfil[ing] existing contracts …; (iii)… should not in future sanction new orders for any defence equipment which in our view would significantly enhance the capacity of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict; (iv) … continue to scrutinise rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq. (D1.59) 
